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non-specialists alike. Admittedly, many of the details related to the appearance 
and'publication of the books are dry and,'at times, tedious. Nonetheless, in 
the concluding sections to eaclvchapter, Hegel skillfully demonstrates the'link 
between the physical form of the novels and what these material characteristics 
reveal about.Chinese society and culture throughout the ages. Thus, the book is 
of value not only, to scholars of Chinese literature, but also to those specializing 
in the history, material culture,'and art of imperial China. Comparatively, it will 
be of particular importance to bibliophiles, art historians, and scholars with ah 
interest in the technology of printing. •; , , 
College de France Nancy Park 
Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen: Chinese Foreign Policy 'during the Cul-
tural Revolution. (London: Kegan Paul International" 1998), xi + 252 pp.,"$ 93.50. 
ISBN 0-7103-0580-X. " - ' 
i - .. " 
Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen's latest book, explores the impact of the 
Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign poUcy.»The first of its four main chapters 
examines the insertion of Cultural Revolution politics into the foreign policy 
establishment, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second chapter 
traces ..the ideological presuppositions that guided Mao in his formulation of 
policy,,and the remaining two chapters review the ways.by which the Cultural 
Revolution spilled over into the, conduct of diplomacy and its effect upon bilat-
eral relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Japan." 
In the early phases of the Cultural Revolution the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was decimated by„factional conflict that pitted younger members of the ministry 
staff against their superiors and generated an atmosphere of intense fear, dis-
trust and mutual suspicion. It was in many ways a microcosm of what was 
happening elsewhere in the country, and as elsewhere the. result .was confusion, 
paralysis, and a decided shift_to the left. Remembered by-many in_the. West as 
the eminence grise of China's foreign policy establishment, one.finds here Pre-
mier Zhou Enlai scrambling to maintain an element of coherence and rationality 
in China's external relations and to. protect some of his allies (notably Foreign 
Minister Chen I). -
With the foreign, policy apparatus in disarrays China's foreign affairs came to 
be, dominated more than ever by Mao Zedong.-As Barnouin aridiYu point out, 
some analysts in the West have, attempted to trace the foreign policy shifts of 
the period to political struggle and differences of opinion held by.elite groups 
with the Communist Party eliter Barnouin and Yu maintain, however, that from 
the onset of the Cultural Revolution until trie mid- to late-, 1970s the main centers 
of power within the Chinesej,.Commurust Party (e.g., the Politburo, and the 
Central Secretariat) were-paralyzed, leaving foreign „policy in-the hands of a 
"personal hierarchy" at the top of which sat Mao himself. Mao's ideas and per-
sonal views on international matters were the driving force guiding policy, and 
Barnouin and Yu demonstrate that there was a correspondence" between shifts 
in.policyand changes in Mao's thinking."Indeed; Mao's role as the Communist 
Party's,undisputed foreign policy leader was institutionalized as early as 1943, 
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and by 1949 he'had emerged as the dominant personality within a poUcy-making 
constellation that placed heavy' emphasis on personal^ leadership: Thus,- Mao's 
domination of-foreign policy was a manifestation of habits that were firmly in 
place long before the Cultural Revolution was conceived: Such debates as there 
were usually were confined to the application of principles laid down by him, 
while the administration of foreign policy was fanned out to government or 
party agencies. 
As Map monopolized policy, his ideology played a decisive role in laying the 
agenda. As is well known, whereas at first Mao had allied China with the Soviet 
Union, by 1956 he had become disenchanted with the Soviets and decided that 
China should take over leadership of the world revolution and aggressively pro-
mote the cause of international communism. By 1965, the process of radicaliza-
tion had reached a peak: Mao identified US imperialism as a serious threat to 
China, called for people's war to oppose it, and labeled the USSR a revisionist 
state and a traitor to the. revolutionary cause. Thus, by the early stages of the 
Cultural Revolution Chinese foreign policy was driven by Mao's conviction that 
the world revolution was about to enter a new stage in which revolutionary 
upheaval was sure to envelop the capitalist world_and deal it a crushing'blow. 
The same revolutionary.ideology that factored prominently in the Cultural Revo-
lution governed "China's contacts with the outside world, and the result was a 
string of .foreign policy disasters such.as the Red Square Incident of January, 
1967, and the,, burning of the'British mission in Beijing in August of the same 
year. 
Eventually, as the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution waned, Mao's ideo-
logical arid revolutionary preoccupations gave way to cooler, more rational cal-
culations of China's national interest, and foreign policy was de-linked from do-
mestic politics. Once again, it was'Mao himself who took the lead. By the late 
1960s he had concluded that it was the Soviet Union, not the United States, that 
presented the greatest threat to China's interests, and as a result there'was a 
"sea-change" in China's foreign policy.Ideological polemics continued to play a 
conspicuous role .in public, but behind the-scenes steps were taken to open 
communication with the US 'and prepare the way for eventual rapprochement 
Barnouini and Yu show, incidentally, that Mao's efforts in this regard were as-
sisted by activity on the American side that gave Mao the opportunity to charac-
terize the opening to the US as a Chinese response to a US initiative. 
Much.of what Barnouin and Yu1 present is derived from secondary sources 
already in print Their original contribution is limited to the first chapter which 
deals .with: the internal effects of the Cultural Revolution upon the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: There, the insights-are new and they are based largely upon 
interviews with former Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff and rebel leaders that 
were conducted in Beijing between 1991 and 1993. 
The book contains an appendix that includes a chronology and twenty-eight 
documents dating to the later phases of the Cultural Revolution, i.e., from 1967 
to 1974, when Mao was attempting to stabilize the conduct of foreign relations 
and change its direction -toward accommodation with the United States. Al-
though; Barnouin and Yu do not analyze them, as such, they seem to reveal a 
tendency for.Beijing leaders to employ ideological formulas for public consump-
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tion while in their communications with one another dealing with matters more 
pragmatically." Apparently, despite the Cultural Revolution's encroachment upon 
the foreign policy domain and its disruption of normal relations,' there remained 
a core of leaders .who never entirely lost sight of China's national security needs. 
Sacred Heart University Thomas D. Curran 
Austin, Greg: China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and 
National Development. (St. Leonard's: Allen and Unwin in association with Can-
berra: Department of International Relations and the Northeast Asia Area Pro-
gram, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National Univer-
sity, 1998), xxxii + 415 pp., pbk $ 29.95. ISBN 1-86373-982-3. 
The ultimate sovereign status of the island of Taiwan, China's principal off-
shore territory, is not questioned by any power capable of altering it, but lesser 
islands are not uncontestedly Chinese. Japan contests the Senkaku Islands 
northeast of Taiwan. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam contests the .Paracel 
Islands, apex of a triangle whose base runs between .Vietnam and Hainan Island. 
The broadcast Spratly Islands are contested by the Philippines and by Malaysia. 
China draws cartographic claim to the Paracels and the Spratlys by enclosing 
them within the great looping w-shaped line shown in Austin's Map 3. Speculating 
on the ontology of the line in a lengthy footnote (p; 14), Austin suggests it origi-
nated in a map of April 1935 that emanated from interdepartmental committee 
meetings charged by the Chinese government to "check and approve the names 
of 132 islands, sand cays, submerged:reefs and shoals in the.South China Sea." 
A Republic of China source says the line first appeared on a 1948 Chinese map; 
a PRC source says it was a 1947 Chinese reaction to the 1945 Truman Declaration 
which for the first time reckoned a nation's off-shore jurisdiction by its continen-
tal shelf. -
•< Austin says, "The legal, significance of this line should now be interpreted 
more in the chauvinistic spirit with which the PRC and ROC governments of the 
1950s and: 1960s approached questions of sovereignty, than as evidence of likely 
policy.intent for the late 1990s. Traces'of chauvinistic spirit remain in PRC ap-
proaches to legal issues, but this has not been the dominant approach in Beijing 
to law of the sea issues for some time. There is reason to believe that the PRC 
might be prepared to abandon the w-shaped line in the South China Sea as unau-
thoritative, but it "will not make this position clear until it-sees just'what'the 
negotiating positions of other countries are. and hence is able, to refine its own. 
It'would probably prefer to give up this line late, in negotiations where the sur-
render could be presented as a concession." (p. 221) 
Austin argues "that PRC claims to disputed offshore islands ... are motivated 
primarily by a strong, unshakeable conviction that these territories legitimately 
belong to China according to commonly accepted standards of international law" 
(p. 4). Regarding the several claims, he concludes, "Beijing has an:undefeatable 
claim-to sovereignty.over the.Paracel Islands; it has no defensible claim to the 
SenkakuTsIands; it has a very strong claim to sovereignty of some,:possibly all 
of the.Spratly Islands " Inasmuch as the evidence cited throughout his book 
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